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Abstract
A survey of the /eld of hypercomputation, including discussion of four a priori objections to
the possibility of hypercomputation. An exegesis of Turing’s pre- and post-war writings on the
mind is given, and Turing’s views on the scope of machines are discussed.
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1. What is hypercomputation?
Hypercomputation is the computation of functions or numbers that cannot be com-
puted in the sense of Turing [50], i.e. cannot be computed with paper and pencil in
a /nite number of steps by a human clerk working e<ectively. 1 A hypercomputer is
any machine, notional or real, that is able to compute more than this human computer.
Hypercomputers compute functions or numbers, or more generally solve problems or
carry out tasks, that lie beyond the reach of the standard universal Turing machine.
The additional computational power of a hypercomputer may arise because the ma-
chine possesses, among its repertoire of fundamental operations, one or more processes
that no human being unaided by machinery can perform. Or the additional power may
arise because certain of the restrictions customarily imposed on the human computer
are absent in the case of the hypercomputer—for example, the restrictions that data
take the form of symbols on paper, that all data be supplied in advance of the com-
putation, and that the rules followed by the computer remain /xed for the duration of
the computation. In one interesting family of hypercomputers, what is relaxed is the
restriction that the human computer produce the result, or each digit of the result, in
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some /nite number of steps. Some notional hypercomputers are discrete state machines
while others involve in/nite precision measurements or real-valued connection weights
and the like.
Section 2 describes some elementary models of hypercomputation. These simple
notional machines serve to make the point that computability is a relative notion, not
an absolute one. All computation takes place relative to some set or other of capacities,
richer or poorer. The capacities speci/ed by Turing in 1936 [50] occupy no privileged
position.
Section 3 deals with some objections to the possibility of hypercomputation.
Section 4 concerns Turing’s oracle machines or o-machines [51]. Section 5 discusses
some exegetical issues concerning the writings of Turing and Church.
2. Elementary models
2.1. Coupled Turing machines
Coupled Turing machines are described in [10, pp. 694–695 and 19, pp. 51–52] (the
term ‘coupled Turing machine’ is from the latter paper). A coupled Turing machine is
a Turing machine coupled to an environment. In [59] the term ‘interaction machine’
is used for essentially the same idea.
Turing machines accept no input while operating. A /nite amount of data may be
inscribed on the tape before the computation starts, but thereafter the machine runs
in isolation from its environment. A coupled Turing machine results from coupling
a Turing machine to its environment via an input channel (or any /nite number of
input channels). Each channel supplies a stream of symbols to the tape as the machine
operates. The machine might also possess one or more output channels, which return
symbols to the environment. Depending on the nature of the input, the activity of a
coupled Turing machine may not be simulable by the universal Turing machine.
The proof that with appropriate input a coupled Turing machine is hypercomputa-
tional is trivial. Let ‘’ (for Turing) be the number 0 · h1h2h3 : : : ; where hi is 1 if the
ith machine halts when started with a blank tape, and is 0 otherwise [11,14]. Let T
be a coupled Turing machine with a single input channel and let the digits of  form
the input. T ’s input channel writes to a single square of T ’s tape and each successive
symbol hi in the input stream overwrites its predecessor on this square. As each in-
put arrives, T performs some minor computation with it—multiplies it by 2, say—and
writes the result on some designated squares of the tape (in order to keep the time of
operation constant, the next result always overwrites its predecessor). The succession
2× h1; 2× h2 : : : is not Turing-machine-computable.
2.2. Partially random machines
A partially random machine (the term is from Turing’s [53, p. 9] is a machine
some of whose actions are the outcome of random inHuences but whose operations
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are otherwise determined, e.g. by a program. Some partially random machines are
hypercomputational [14, pp. 28–31].
One of the simplest examples of a hypercomputational partially random machine
consists of a coupled Turing machine with a single input line carrying an in/nite
sequence of binary digits that is random. As Church argued, if a sequence of digits
r1; r2; : : : ; rn; : : : is random, then there is no function f(n)= rn that is calculable by the
universal Turing machine [8, pp. 134–135]. Let the coupled machine be T , as above.
T prints out on its tape the sequence of digits 2× r1; : : : : Since this sequence is itself
random, the universal Turing machine cannot produce it.
One might be inclined to think that randomness is not a useful route to hypercompu-
tation, for what work of practical value could such a machine perform? One practical
application of partially random machines lies in cryptography. Following the Second
World War, Colossus—the /rst large-scale electronic computer (see [15,16])—was used
in conjunction with a random device (endearingly code-named the ‘Donald Duck’) for
the high-volume production of one time pad in the form of punched paper tape. The
overall set-up—modi/ed Colossus plus Donald Duck—is perspicuously represented as
a hypercomputer whose output is an endless supply of one time pad. (For more on the
concept of perspicuous representation, see Section 3.4.)
2.3. Hypercomputation via perfect measurement
According to some classical physical theories, the world contains continuously valued
physical magnitudes (for example, the theory of continuous elastic solids in Euclidean
space). The magnitude of some physical quantity might conceivably be exactly  units.
Suppose that some mechanism A stores exactly  units of such a physical quantity,
which for the sake of vividness one might call ‘charge’. Suppose further that a mech-
anism B can measure the quantity of ‘charge’ stored in A to any speci/ed number
of signi/cant /gures. B determines hn by measuring A’s charge to suMciently many
signi/cant /gures and outputting the nth digit of the result. A and B together form an
oracle for the problem: ‘Determine, for any given n, whether or not the nth Turing
machine halts.’
Is this arrangement of notional components a machine? In [14] I argue that it is
so in the sense of ‘machine’ crucial to the historical debate between mechanists and
anti-mechanists about physiological and psychological mechanism (a debate involving
such /gures as Descartes, Hobbes, and de la Mettrie). Bechtel and Richardson [2,
p. 23] speak aptly of the mechanists’ twin heuristic strategies of decomposition and
localisation. The former heuristic seeks to decompose the activity of the system whose
functioning is to be explained into a number of subordinate activities; the latter at-
tributes these subordinate activities to speci/c components of the system. The core of
the claim, as put forward by the historical mechanists, that such-and-such naturally
occurring item—a living body, say—is a machine is this: the item’s operation can be
accounted for in monistic, materialist terms and in a manner analogous to that in which
the operation of an artefact, such as a clockwork /gure or church organ, is explained
in terms of the nature and arrangement of its components. The oracle just described,
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no less than the universal Turing machine, is a machine in the sense that its behaviour
is the product of the nature and arrangement of its material parts.
The claim that the mind is a machine, in the sense of ‘machine’ used by the historical
mechanists, is evidently consistent with the hypothesis that the mind is a form of oracle
machine (see further [14]).
Of course, the perfect measuring device B is thoroughly hypothetical. Nevertheless,
this model hypercomputer serves to illustrate the point that, in discussing whether
oracular computation can be carried out in the real world, we are discussing an out-
and-out empirical matter.
2.4. Accelerating Turing machines
A universal Turing machine that operates like Bertrand Russell’s accelerating worker
[42] is able to solve the Turing-machine halting problem [11,12,17]. In a discussion
of a paper by Alice Ambrose [1] Russell wrote:
Miss Ambrose says it is logically impossible [for a man] to run through the
whole expansion of 
. I should have said it was medically impossible. : : : The
opinion that the phrase ‘after an in/nite number of operations’ is self-contradictory,
seems scarcely correct. Might not a man’s skill increase so fast that he performed
each operation in half the time required for its predecessor? In that case, the
whole in/nite series would take only twice as long as the /rst operation [42, pp.
143–144].
An accelerating universal Turing machine (AUTM) speeds up in the manner de-
scribed by Russell. Since Turing imposed no restrictions on the temporal patterning of
a Turing machine’s operations, an AUTM is a Turing machine within the full meaning
of the act. Because
1 + 12 +
1
4 +
1
8 + · · ·+ 12n−1 + · · ·
is less than 2, the AUTM requires less than two units of running time to do everything
that the program on its tape instructs it to do. This is true even in the case of a
program that does not halt—each of the in/nite number of operations that the non-
halting program instructs the machine to perform will be completed before the end of
the second unit of running time.
Given any Turing machine program, the AUTM is able to determine, in a /nite
amount of time, whether or not the program halts. The program is inscribed on the
tape of the AUTM. The initial square of the AUTM’s tape is reserved for a display
of the outcome of the AUTM’s computation, 0 for ‘does not halt’ or 1 for ‘halts’.
The AUTM begins its work by writing 0 on the initial square; it then proceeds, in the
usual manner of the universal machine, to simulate the machine whose program it has
been given. If the program halts then the scanner of the AUTM returns to the initial
square of the tape and replaces the 0 written there during the setting-up procedure by
1. If, on the other hand, the program does not halt, the scanner of the AUTM never
returns to the start of the tape. Either way, at the end of the second unit of operating
time the initial square contains the desired answer. (Without acceleration, this machine
is a Gold–Putnam machine [24,40]; see also [3,4,23,26].)
B.J. Copeland / Theoretical Computer Science 317 (2004) 251–267 255
2.5. Asynchronous networks of Turing machines
Asynchronous networks of Turing machines are described in [19, p. 54] (we /rst
learned of the idea from Aaron Sloman in correspondence). 2
The standard textbook proof that any /nite assembly of Turing machines can be
simulated by the universal Turing machine involves the idea of the universal machine
interleaving the processing steps that are performed by the individual machines in
the assembly. The proof assumes that the machines in the assembly are operating in
synchrony: in the case of asynchronously operating machines, there may be no e<ective
way of interleaving the steps.
Under certain conditions, a simple network of two non-halting Turing machines
writing binary digits to a common, initially blank, single-ended tape cannot be simulated
by the universal Turing machine. Let the machines in the network be m1 and m2 and
let the additional common tape be T ; m1 and m2 work uni-directionally along T , never
writing on a square that has already been written on, and writing only on squares all
of whose predecessors have already been written on. (If m1 and m2 attempt to write
simultaneously to the same square, a refereeing mechanism gives priority to m1.) If
m1 and m2 operate in synchrony, the evolving contents of T can be calculated by
the universal machine. Where m1 and m2 operate asynchronously, the same is true if
the timing function associated with each machine, 1 and 2, respectively, is Turing-
machine-computable. The timing function i is de/ned as follows (where n, k¿1):
i(n)= k if and only if k units of operating time separate the nth fundamental operation
performed by mi from the n+1th. If, however, the machines are not in synchrony and
at least one of the two timing functions is not Turing-machine-computable, then the
machines can inscribe a number on T that is not Turing-machine-computable. (For
example, suppose that m1 prints only 1s, m2 prints only 0s, and that the sequence
of printings on T consists of 1 followed by h1 occurrences of 0—i.e. one or no
occurrence—followed by 1 followed by h2 occurrences of 0, etc.)
Synchrony is often assumed in biological modelling. Harvey and Bossomaier [25]
suggest that modellers have been deterred from considering asynchronous models—
for example, asynchronous boolean networks—because of their assumed intractability.
Harvey and Bossomaier remark that, in the absence of empirical justi/cation for the
‘assumption of synchrony’, the value of synchronous models is in doubt for many
biological systems [25, p. 75].
3. Objections to the possibility of hypercomputation
This section answers four objections. Versions of each are commonly encountered.
The /rst two objections are epistemological in nature, and the third and fourth concern
/niteness. (Some other objections to the possibility of hypercomputation are answered
in my [18].)
2 Mark Burgin [5] argues that even a system of two asynchronous /nite automata is hypercomputational.
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3.1. First objection
“Suppose Laplace’s genius says: ‘Here is a black box for solving the Turing-machine
halting problem.’ Type in any integer n and the box will deliver the corresponding
value of the halting function hn—or so Laplace’s genius tells us. But since there is
no systematic method for calculating the values of the halting function, we have no
means of testing whether or not the machine is producing correct answers. A computing
machine that cannot be checked for reliability—useless!”
Yet the mathematical community can, in principle, check whether or not the machine
has produced correct answers (assuming an unlimited supply of mathematicians). Since
there is no uniform method for carrying out the check, from time to time new methods
will have to be devised.
This response to the objection might be thought unrealistic, but given its purpose it
is not. The response shows that the crucial step in the objection, namely the inference
from ‘there is no systematic method for calculating the values of the halting function’
to ‘we have no means of testing’, is a non-sequitur. The absence of a systematic method
is no block to calculation. Turing himself said as much, in a di<erent connection:
Let  be a sequence whose nth /gure is 1 or 0 according as n is or is not
satisfactory. It is an immediate consequence of the theorem of § 8 that  is not
computable. It is (so far as we know at present) possible that any assigned number
of /gures of  can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When suMciently
many /gures of  have been calculated, an essentially new method is necessary
in order to obtain more /gures. [50, p. 253]
(n is satisfactory if it is the description number of a circle-free Turing machine, i.e.,
a Turing machine that prints an in/nite number of binary digits, and is unsatisfactory
otherwise.)
It might be thought that this answer to the objection simply begs the question, for
does not the answer assume that mathematicians are not Turing machines? This is not
presupposed, however. The fact that no single Turing machine can calculate the values
of the halting function does not entail that a community of Turing machines cannot
do so.
Turing made some remarks relevant to the latter issue in a letter to Max
Newman. (The letter was written while Turing was working on Enigma at Bletchley
Park. Newman taught Turing at Cambridge before the war. In 1942 Newman joined
the codebreakers at Bletchley Park. There he mechanized Tutte’s method of attack on
the German Tunny machine and designed the Heath Robinson, precursor to Colossus,
the /rst large-scale electronic computer (see [15]).) Turing said:
I think you take a much more radically Hilbertian attitude about mathematics than
I do. You say ‘If all this whole formal out/t is not about /nding proofs which can
be checked on a machine it’s diMcult to know what it is about’. When you say
‘on a machine’ do you have in mind that there is (or should be or could be, but
has not been actually described anywhere) some /xed machine on which proofs
are to be checked, and that the formal out/t is, as it were about this machine. If
you take this attitude (and it is this one that seems to me so extreme Hilbertian)
there is little more to be said: we simply have to get used to the technique of this
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machine and resign ourselves to the fact that there are some problems to which
we can never get the answer. On these lines my ordinal logics would make no
sense. However I don’t think you really hold quite this attitude because you admit
that in the case of the GUodel example one can decide that the formula is true
i.e. you admit that there is a fairly de/nite idea of a true formula which is quite
di<erent from the idea of a provable one. Throughout my paper on ordinal logics
[51] I have been assuming this too. : : :
If you think of various machines I don’t see your diMculty. One imagines di<er-
ent machines allowing di<erent sets of proofs, and by choosing a suitable machine
one can approximate ‘truth’ by ‘provability’ better than with a less suitable ma-
chine, and can in a sense approximate it as well as you please. The choice of
a proof checking machine involves intuition, which is interchangeable with the
intuition required for /nding an  if one has an ordinal logic , or as a third
alternative one may go straight for the proof and this again requires intuition:
or one may go for a proof /nding machine. I am rather puzzled why you draw
this distinction between proof /nders and proof checkers. It seems to me rather
unimportant as one can always get a proof /nder from a proof checker, and the
converse is almost true: the converse fails if for instance one allows the proof
/nder to go through a proof in the ordinary way, and then, rejecting the steps,
to write down the /nal formula as a ‘proof’ of itself. One can easily think up
suitable restrictions on the idea of proof which will make this converse true and
which agree well with our ideas of what a proof should be like. 3
3.2. Second objection
The second epistemological objection concerns underdetermination. A version of the
objection is attributed to Dana Scott, who is quoted by Davis as follows [21]:
70 years of research on Turing degrees has shown the structure to be extremely
complicated. In other words, the hierarchy of oracles is worse than any political
system. No one oracle is all powerful.
Suppose some quantum genius gave you an oracle as a black box. No /nite
amount of observation would tell you what it does and why it is non-recursive.
Hence, there would be no way to write an algorithm to solve an understandable
problem you couldn’t solve before! Interpretation of oracular statements is a very
/ne art—as they found out at Delphi!
The problem that Scott is pointing to appears, however, to be a particular case of the
general problem posed by Kripke’s Wittgenstein [34]—and this is everyone’s problem,
having nothing to do with non-recursiveness per se. To illustrate: suppose God hands
you a black box, informing you only that the box is able to tell you all the values of
some Turing-machine computable two-place function on the natural numbers. No /nite
amount of observation would reveal what the black box does. Plus or quus? ‘Quus’ is
Kripke’s term for a ‘bent’ version of integer addition, behaving like normal addition
3 Letter from Turing to Newman, undated, cc. 1940 (in the Modern Archive Centre, King’s College,
Cambridge (catalogue reference D 2)).
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live bead
Fig. 1. An oracle-machine universe.
over some initial segment of the number sequence and then deviating in some way.
Does the box implement plus, or quus1, or quus2, or : : : ? No matter how many pairs
of numbers are tried out—/nitely many—the box’s behaviour will be consistent with
many di<erent rules.
Engineers will want to know why we are required to treat the device as a black
box. Why can’t we take it apart and study it in the light of our best physical theories?
Once they have taken the plus/quus box apart and reassembled it, the engineers may
tell us ‘Given current physics, our best hypothesis is that this box will add any pair
of non-negative integers (so long as you insert more tape whenever the red light goes
on).’ It is because we believe similar pronouncements by engineers that we entrust our
savings, and in the case of air travel even our lives, to computers. The engineers’ task
is in principle no di<erent in the case of Scott’s box, assuming, as we may in this
imaginary scenario, that the best quantum physics of their day is non-recursive.
3.3. Third objection
“Hypercomputation requires that an in/nite amount of information exist in a /nite
volume of space. This is not physically possible. So hypercomputation is physically
impossible.”
Gert-Jan Lokhorst put the objection this way: hypercomputation infringes the
‘Bekenstein bound’—Bekenstein argued that consideration of the maximum number
of distinguishable quantum states of any system occupying a spherical region of space
with /nite radius and /nite energy suggests that the system can contain only a /nite
amount of information [35].
To rebut this objection it suMces to consider a simple oracle-machine universe (see
Fig. 1). An oracle-machine universe is a toy universe with discrete time (see [37, pp.
30–33 and 380]). The dynamical evolution of the universe is described by some func-
tion on the non-negative integers that is not Turing-machine computable. The universe
depicted in Fig. 1 consists of nothing but a /nite string of beads. Some beads are
cubic and some are spherical. The bead at the right-hand end of the string (from the
reader’s perspective) is designated ‘live’. The universe grows in discrete spurts, one
spurt each second. A spurt consists of the live bead producing a single o<spring bead.
The o<spring takes its place at the end of the string beside its parent, becoming the
live bead and producing its own o<spring at the next spurt.
Irrespective of the shape of the parent, the o<spring may be spherical or cubic. The
fundamental law of nature determining the shape of the o<spring of the nth bead in
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the string is:
Spherical if hn = 0; cubic if hn = 1:
The string that grows from a single initial bead is always /nite, although unbounded.
At no point in the evolution of the universe is there an in/nite amount of information
in a /nite volume of space.
The growing string is in e<ect an oracle for the halting function.
3.4. Fourth objection
“No /nite discrete system can be hypercomputational. Any discrete state machine
whose total number of con/gurations is /nite can be perfectly simulated by a Turing
machine. This is so simply because any /nite set is computable (which in turn is so
in virtue of the fact that it is legitimate to code the members of any /nite set onto the
tape of a Turing machine as initial data). In the real world, no machine can have an
in/nite number of con/gurations. Artefacts wear out and break down, brains die. Even
a machine that in and of itself could continue running forever would pass through only
a /nite number of con/gurations before the heat death of the universe. Any real-world
discrete state machine is equivalent to a Turing machine.”
There is of course a parallel objection applying to non-discrete machines, and in
that case ‘perfectly simulated’ is replaced by something like ‘simulated to any required
degree of accuracy’.
These objections are often advanced. This is surprising, for as long ago as 1992
Hilary Putnam dealt decisively with both forms.
[E]very physical system whose behavior we want to know only up to some speci-
/ed level of accuracy and whose ‘lifetime’ is /nite can be simulated by [a Turing
machine]! [This] does not prove that such a simulation is in any sense a perspic-
uous representation of the behavior of the system. [41, p. 6].
As Putnam pointed out, a perspicuous representation addresses competence, whereas
the objection in e<ect considers only performance [41, pp. 6–7]. Putnam continued:
In sum, it does not seem that there is any principled reason why we must be
perspicuously representable as Turing machines : : : Or any reason why we must
be representable in this way at all—even non-perspicuously—under the idealization
that we live forever and have potentially in/nite external memories. [41, p. 7].
There is in addition a diMculty concerning the knowledge that is required in order
for a Turing machine to carry out its simulation of the hypercomputational discrete state
machine. How is this knowledge to be obtained? Equipped with some form of look-up
table setting out the entire behaviour of the hypercomputer during its /nite life, the
Turing machine can certainly regurgitate the behaviour, so simulating the hypercom-
puter. But the table may be obtainable only post hoc, by running the hypercomputer
and exhaustively logging its behaviour through its /nite life.
The sheer fact that the /nitely-lived hypercomputer can be simulated by a Turing
machine tells you nothing of any real interest about the hypercomputer, and certainly
does not imply that in practice the hypercomputer is redundant.
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4. Turing’s o-machines: a general framework for hypercomputation
Turing’s abstract o-machines seem to be the earliest and most general form of hy-
percomputer to appear in the literature. (Turing introduced the concept of an o-machine
in his Ph.D. thesis (Princeton, 1938); subsequently published as [51], this is a classic
of recursive function theory.) An o-machine is a Turing machine augmented with an
‘oracle’—a fundamental process that produces the values of some non Turing-machine-
computable function (for example the Turing-machine halting function). The concept
of oracular computation can pro/tably be employed in theorizing about hardware, about
brains, and about minds.
Turing introduced oracle machines with the following words [51, pp. 172–173]:
Let us suppose that we are supplied with some unspeci/ed means of solving
number-theoretic problems; a kind of oracle as it were. We shall not go any
further into the nature of this oracle apart from saying that it cannot be a machine.
With the help of the oracle we could form a new kind of machine (call them
o-machines), having as one of its fundamental processes that of solving a given
number-theoretic problem.
By the statement that an oracle ‘cannot be a machine’, Turing perhaps meant that an
oracle cannot be a machine of the kind so far considered in his discussion, viz. a
machine that calculates e<ectively—a Turing machine. His statement is then nothing
more than a reiteration of what he himself had shown in [50]. (This interpretation is
to an extent supported by the fact that in the preceding pages Turing several times
uses simply ‘machine’ where he clearly intends ‘computing machine’.) Or perhaps
his view might have been that o-machines are machines one of whose fundamental
processes is implemented by a component that is not in turn a machine. Not every
component of a machine need be a machine. One might even take a more extreme
view and say that the atomic components of machines—e.g. squares of paper—are
never machines. (Modern writers who believe that there can be non-mechanical physical
action might well choose to speak of machines with components that, while physical,
are not themselves machines.)
In a critique of hypercomputation, Hodges [29] argues that according to Turing,
o-machines are not literally machines. Hodges quotes Turing’s statement that an oracle
‘cannot be a machine’ and asserts that an o-machine cannot therefore be a machine.
Hodges does not quote Turing’s statement that with ‘the help of the oracle we could
form a new kind of machine’ and his interpretation latches onto the /rst of these
statements while ignoring the second. Nor does he address the fact that Turing did
repeatedly refer to o-machines as machines. For example [51, pp. 172–173]:
Given any one of these machines : : :
If the machine is in the internal con/guration : : :
These machines may be described by tables of the same kind as
those used for the description of a-machines : : :
(a-machines are what we now call Turing machines [50, pp. 231–232].) In any case,
Hodges’ inference from the statement that an oracle ‘cannot be a machine’ to the
conclusion that o-machines are ‘only partly mechanical’ is logically on a par with: ‘Ink
is not a machine, therefore a Turing machine is only partly mechanical’ (machines can
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have parts that are not themselves machines). In short, Turing said that oracle machines
are machines and there seems no reason not to take him at his word.
Turing’s description of o-machines is entirely abstract; he introduced them in order to
exhibit an example of a certain type of mathematical problem (the section in which o-
machines are introduced is entitled ‘A type of problem which is not number-theoretic’).
In [50] he exhibited a problem which cannot be solved by e<ective means, the prob-
lem of determining, given any Turing machine, whether or not it prints in/nitely
many binary digits. All problems equivalent to this one he termed ‘number-theoretic’
(noting that he was using the term ‘number-theoretic’ in a ‘rather restricted sense’)
[51, pp. 168–170]. The o-machine concept enabled him to describe a new type of
problem, not solvable by a uniform process even with the help of a number-theoretic
oracle. The class of machines whose oracles solve number-theoretic problems is, he
showed, subject to the same diagonal argument that he used in [50]. The problem of
determining, given any such machine, whether or not it prints in/nitely many binary
digits is not one that can be solved by any machine in the class and, therefore, is not
number-theoretic [51, p. 173]. Turing appealed to o-machines in discussing the ques-
tion of the completeness of the ‘ordinal logics’ that he described [51, p. 200]. Via a
suitable class of oracle machines and the diagonal argument, a logic itself forms the
basis for the construction of a problem with which it cannot deal.
Turing, as he said, did ‘not go any further into the nature’ of an oracle. There are
by now in the literature numerous ways of /lling out the idea of an oracle, some more
physical in Havour than others. 4 To mention only a few examples, an oracle is in
principle realisable by certain classical electrodynamical systems [43,44]; the physical
process of equilibriation [22]; an automaton travelling through relativistic spacetime
[30,31,39]; a quantum mechanical computer [6,32,33,48,49]; an inter-neural connec-
tion [46,47]; and a temporally evolving sequence of Turing machines, representing for
example a learning mind (see [18]).
5. Exegetical issues: Turing and Church
5.1. The scope of machines: Hodges on Church on Turing
In his 1937 review of Turing’s [50], Church said:
The author [Turing] proposes as a criterion that an in/nite sequence of digits
0 and 1 be ‘computable’ that it shall be possible to devise a computing machine,
4 One of the /rst to speak of oracles in physical terms was Davis [20, p. 11]. He said: ‘For how can we ever
exclude the possibility of our being presented, some day (perhaps by some extraterrestrial visitors), with a
(perhaps extremely complex) device or “oracle” that “computes” a noncomputable function?’ Acknowledging
that the possibility cannot be ruled out, Davis said: ‘However, there are fairly convincing reasons for believing
that this will never happen’ [20, p. 11]. The only argument that he o<ered is conspicuously weak, consisting
of the observation that certain modi/cations to a Turing machine—he mentioned machines able to insert
squares into their own tape, machines able to move left or right more than a single square in a single
operation, and machines that operate on two- (or higher) dimensional tape—result in a machine no more
powerful than a Turing machine [20, pp. 11–12, 64].
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occupying a /nite space and with working parts of /nite size, which will write
down the sequence to any desired number of terms if allowed to run for a suf-
/ciently long time. As a matter of convenience, certain further restrictions are
imposed on the character of the machine, but these are of such a nature as obvi-
ously to cause no loss of generality—in particular, a human calculator, provided
with pencil and paper and explicit instructions, can be regarded as a kind of Tur-
ing machine. It is thus immediately clear that computability, so de/ned, can be
identi/ed with (especially, is no less general than) the notion of e<ectiveness as
it appears in certain mathematical problems : : : [7, pp. 42–43]
Hodges claims that this passage shows that Church ‘equat[ed] the scope of com-
putability with the scope of machines’ [29]. Or to put it the other way round, according
to Hodges, Church equated the scope of machines with the scope of computability in
Turing’s 1936 sense. (Hodges also claims in [29] that his own earlier statement, ‘Alan
had : : : discovered something almost : : : miraculous, the idea of a universal machine
that could take over the work of any machine’ [27, p. 109], ‘reHected’ what Church
said in this quotation.)
Hodges [29] maintains that the (alleged) fact that Church ‘equat[ed] the scope of
computability with the scope of machines’ is a strong indication that Turing did so
too, given that the two men were in close contact at Princeton from 1936 to 1938.
This argument is weak. The historian of mathematics Wilfred Sieg has long maintained
that the passage in question shows that Church apparently misunderstood Turing [45,
pp. 94–95]. ‘Church’s apparent misunderstanding [of Turing] is rather common’, Sieg
noted [45, p. 95].
In fact, however, there is no reason to think that Church was saying what Hodges
claims he was saying. Had Church said simply ‘devise a machine, occupying a /nite
space and with working parts of /nite size’, rather than ‘devise a computing machine,
occupying a /nite space and with working parts of /nite size’, then Hodges might
be on /rmer ground. But Church did not say simply ‘machine’, he said ‘computing
machine’. And in the usage of the day, a computing machine was a machine that works
in accordance with a systematic method or algorithm.
5.2. Hodges on Turing on discrete state machines
In a discussion of Turing’s [54] Hodges says:
Not quite made explicit, but implicit in every statement, is that the operation of
a discrete state machine is computable. [28, p. 35]
Let us examine carefully Turing’s argument in [54] concerning discrete state machines.
After giving an example of a simple discrete state machine with a total of three states
or con/gurations, Turing describes the behaviour of the machine by means of a /nite
table of the sort that would now be called a look-up table, and then says:
This example is typical of discrete state machines. They can be described by such
tables provided they have only a 8nite number of possible states. : : : Given the
table corresponding to a discrete state machine it is possible to predict what it
will do. There is no reason why this calculation should not be carried out by
means of a digital computer. Provided it could be carried out suMciently quickly
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the digital computer could mimic the behaviour of any discrete state machine.
[54, pp. 440–441] (my italics)
Turing’s point appears to be that any discrete state machine whose total number of
con/gurations is /nite can be mimicked by a digital computer (and therefore by a
Turing machine) since the computer can be given a /nite look-up table setting out the
behaviour of the machine. It is unlikely that Turing thought the behaviour of every
discrete state machine with an unlimited number of con/gurations is computable.
5.3. The pre- and post-war Turing on the mind
Concerning Turing’s [51] Hodges writes:
the evidence is that at this time [Turing] was open to the idea that in moments
of ‘intuition’ the mind appears to do something outside the scope of the Turing
machine. [28, p. 22]
but that:
in the course of the war Turing dismissed the role for uncomputability in the
description of mind, which once he had cautiously explored with the ordinal logics.
[28, p. 51]
and:
by 1945 Turing had come to believe computable operations had suMcient scope to
include intelligent behaviour, and had /rmly rejected the direction he had followed
in studying ordinal logics. [28, p. 30]
What changed Turing’s mind, Hodges suggests, was his experience at Bletchley Park:
My guess is that there was a turning point in about 1941. After a bitter struggle
to break U-boat Enigma, Turing could then taste triumph. Machines turned and
people carried out mechanical methods unthinkingly, with amazing and unforeseen
results. : : : [I] suggest that it was at this period that [Turing] abandoned the idea
that moments of intuition corresponded to uncomputable operations. Instead, he
decided, the scope of the computable encompassed : : : quite enough to include all
that human brains did, however creative or original. [28, pp. 28–29]
The mathematician Peter Hilton, Turing’s friend and colleague and a leading code-
breaker at Bletchley Park, comments as follows (in a letter) on these passages by
Hodges:
I must say that, if Alan Turing’s thinking was undergoing so dramatic a change
at that time, he concealed the fact very e<ectively. 5
There is no textual evidence for the supposed sea-change in Turing’s thinking about
the mind. What Turing [51] said is perfectly consistent with his post-war views (see
[13, p. 45]). Indeed, Turing’s later work on the mind, far from representing a rejection
of his earlier ideas, appears to be a development of them. 6
5 Letter from Hilton to Copeland (16 May 2003). Hilton adds: ‘I would never have said that we, working
on Naval Enigma, “carried out mechanical methods unthinkingly”, nor that our results were “amazing and
unforeseen”.’)
6 See [38] for a similar view.
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Turing’s wartime letters to Newman give a useful summary of Turing’s view at
that time of the role of intuition in mathematics. Di<erent Turing machines, Turing
said in the letter quoted above, allow ‘di<erent sets of proofs’ and ‘by choosing a
suitable machine one can approximate “truth” by “provability” better than with a less
suitable machine, and can in a sense approximate it as well as you please’. If one
selects a ‘proof /nding machine’ for proving a particular theorem, intuition is required
in making the selection, just as if one constructed the proof for oneself.
A human mathematician working according to the rules of a /xed logical system is
in e<ect a proof-/nding machine. When intuition supplies the mathematician with some
new means of proof, he or she becomes a di<erent proof-/nding machine, capable of a
larger set of proofs. If there is in principle a limit to the ability of human mathemati-
cians to become transformed into successively more powerful proof-/nding machines,
no such limit has so far been discovered. (The above quotation from Turing’s [50]
beginning ‘Let  be a sequence’ is relevant here.)
Neither in [51] nor in the wartime letters to Newman did Turing attempt to explain
the ‘activity of the intuition’ [51, p. 214]. How does the mathematician manage the
uncomputable transformation from one proof-/nding machine to another? In 1939 Tur-
ing was content to leave this question to one side, making no ‘attempt to explain this
idea of “intuition” any more explicitly’ [51, p. 215]. In his post-war work, on the other
hand, Turing had a lot to say that is relevant to this question.
In his post-war writing on mind and intelligence [52–58] the term ‘intuition’ drops
from view and what comes to the fore is the closely related idea of learning—in the
sense of devising or discovering—new methods of proof. When a human mathematician
is confronted by a problem that he or she is unable to solve, the mathematician ‘would
search around and /nd new methods of proof’ [52, p. 123]. Turing argued forcefully
that machines can do this too.
The limits of a proof-/nding Turing machine are determined by its table of instruc-
tions. The mechanism for acquiring new methods of proof lying beyond this limit must
therefore involve the modi/cation of the table of instructions. Turing said in 1947:
What we want is a machine that can learn from experience. The possibility of
letting the machine alter its own instructions provides the mechanism for this.
[52, p. 123]
And:
One can imagine that after the machine had been operating for some time, the
instructions would have altered out of all recognition. [52, p. 122]
(Ted Newman, one of the engineers at the National Physical Laboratory who built the
Pilot Model ACE (Automatic Computing Engine), remarked that in working on the
ACE, Turing’s
particular purpose was to permit the writing of programs that modify programs,
not in the simple way now common but rather in the way that people think.
[36, p. 12] 7
Modifying the table of instructions in e<ect transforms the learning machine into a
di<erent Turing machine. So a machine with the ability to learn is able to traverse the
7 I am grateful to Teresa Numerico for drawing this article to my attention.
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space of proof-/nding Turing machines. The learning machine successively mutates
from one proof-/nding Turing machine into another, becoming capable of wider sets
of proofs as it searches for and acquires new, more powerful methods of proof.
Turing’s discussions of the nature of learning emphasize two points, the importance
of the learner’s making and correcting mistakes, and the advantages of the involvement
of a ‘random element’ in the learning process, resulting ‘in the behaviour of the ma-
chine not being by any means completely determined by the experiences to which it
was subjected’ [56, p. 461]; see also [53–55]). The idea appears to be that the partially
random learning machine emulates the ‘activity of the intuition’ in its walk through the
space of proof-/nding Turing machines. The trajectory of the learning machine through
this space might indeed be uncomputable, in the precise sense that the function on the
non-negative integers whose value at i is the ith Turing machine on the trajectory need
not be computable by the universal Turing machine.
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